

INDIA DIVIDED

INDIA DIVIDED

BY
RAJENDRA PRASAD



HIND KITABS

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SACRED TO THE MEMORY
OF
MAZHAR-UL-HAQUE
A DEVOUT MUSLIM, A STAUNCH NATIONALIST
AND A PASSIONATE PATRIOT
WHO PREFERRED SERVICE AND SACRIFICE
TO EASE AND COMFORT, POVERTY TO PLENTY,
PRISON TO PALACE, AND SADAQAT ASHRAM
TO SIKANDAR MANZIL.

Rajendra Prasad

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

The question of partition of India into Muslim and Hindu zones has assumed importance since the All-India Muslim League passed a resolution in its favour at Lahore in March, 1940. Much has been written on it and a literature has grown round it. But I believe there is room for another book which tries to discuss the question in all its aspects. In *India Divided* I have made an attempt to collect in a compact form information and material likely to help the reader in forming an opinion of his own. I have expressed my own opinion on the basis of the material so collected but I believe I have placed the material apart from any conclusions I have drawn therefrom and it is open to the reader to ignore my conclusions and draw his own inferences, if he can.

The book is divided into six parts. Part I deals with the theory of Hindus and Muslims of India being two nations. While showing that every-day Muslim

Musalman
mans are a separate nation, the solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem in India should, on the basis of experience of other countries and on the strength of the latest and most authoritative writers of international repute on the subject, be sought in the formation of a multinational State in which a powerful political union guarantees cultural autonomy to different national groups ; and not in the creation of national States which will not only leave the problem of national minorities unsolved but will also create more new problems relating to questions—financial, economic, industrial and political, and military defence and strategy—than it will solve.

Part II discusses at length how the Hindu-Muslim problem has arisen and grown to its present proportions and how with the lengthening of the base of the communal triangle, the angle of difference between the communities has become wider and wider.

Part III gives the summary of a number of schemes of partition which have appeared.

Part IV points out the vagueness and ambiguity of the Lahore Resolution of the All-India Muslim League and the difficulty which faces any one trying to consider it on its merits. It analyses the Resolution and, giving their natural meaning to the words used in the Resolution, it fixes the boundaries of Pakistan.

Part V deals with the resources of the Muslim States and shows how the scheme of partition is impracticable.

Part VI gives various proposals put forward by persons or

bodies for solving the Hindu-Muslim problem.

Parts I, III, IV, V and VI of the book were written in the Bankipur jail and during intervals of comparatively good health. They, therefore, naturally bear the inevitable marks of work done under some limitations. Since my release I have been able to find time to write Part II but none to revise the portion written previously. The difficulty of getting books in jail was removed to a considerable extent by the kindness of Dr Sachchidananda Sinha who freely allowed books to be lent out of the Sinha Library and of Sir Rajiva Ranjan Prasad Sinha, President of the Bihar Legislative Council, who lent some books from the Library of the Bihar Legislature. Shri Shanti Kumar Morarji of Bombay supplied me with a number of books and some statistics. My thanks are due to all these gentlemen. I am thankful to Shri K. T. Shah of Bombay and Professor Balkrishna of the Birla College, Pilani, for some valuable suggestions and to the Birla College for a free use of its library. Typed copy of the portion written in jail was prepared there and my thanks are due to Shri M. John, Secretary, Tata Workers' Union, Jamshedpur for making the typed copy and to Shris S. H. Razi, M. D. Madan and M. K. Ghosh for comparing the typed copy. I am grateful to the Government of Bihar for permitting Shri John to prepare the typed copy. Shri M. K. Ghosh of the Tata Research Laboratory, Jamshedpur, kindly checked the figures and prepared the graphs and I owe him a debt of thanks. My thanks are due also to Shri Mathura Prasad and to Shri Chakradhar Sharan for help of various kinds in preparing Part II and for seeing the book through the press.

I have acknowledged my indebtedness wherever I have taken any statement or quotation from others.

Sadaqat Ashram,
Dighaghat, Patna,
15th December, 1945. }

RAJENDRA PRASAD

PREFACE TO THE NEW IMPRESSION

It has not been possible to revise the text of the book for a reprint. But an addendum has been made bringing the discussion of the subject up to date.

26th April, 1946

RAJENDRA PRASAD

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PART I

THE TWO NATIONS '1877/78'



1. TWO NATIONS—BASIS OF PAKISTAN

The proposal to divide India into separate Muslim and non-Muslim Zones, each such Zone being constituted into an independent sovereign state, is based on the theory that Hindus and Muslims constitute two separate nations. 'Muslims are a nation,' said Mr M. A. Jinnah in his Presidential Address at the Lahore session of the Muslim League which adopted a resolution favouring such division, 'according to any definition of a nation, and they must have their homelands, their territory and their state.' 'It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality, and this misconception of one Indian Nation has gone far beyond the limits and is the cause of most of our troubles and will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures. They neither intermarry nor interdine together, and, indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Muslims derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, different heroes, and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other and, likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state.'

'A Punjabi' who has written a book named *Cotolerance of India* has based his thesis on the same theory. 'From our previous discussions we find that the Hindus and Muslims are two absolutely different entities. Their civilizations are pronouncedly individualistic, and although they may have influenced each other, yet cannot suffer absorption into each other. Their habits and customs, social systems, moral codes, religious practices and cultures are

1. *Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr Jinnah*.

2. *Ibid*, p. 153

traditions, languages, literature, art and outlook on life are absolutely different from, nay hostile to, one another. These heterogeneous essentials of their respective lives are not the elements which go to the formation of a single nation. They always create mutual distrust and misunderstanding. The basic differences between the communities, the memories of their past and present rivalries, and the wrongs they registered against each other during the last one thousand years form an unbridgeable gulf between them. As we have already observed the only thing common between them for the last few centuries has been the common yoke of a foreign rule. As soon as the cord which binds them in a common allegiance to a foreign state snaps, they will disintegrate and their mutual differences, which are not felt at present as acutely as they should, will show themselves more glaringly.³

Profs. Syed Zafrul Hasan and Mohamad Afzal Husain Qadri of Aligarh who have written a pamphlet in which they have worked out a scheme of division of India are not less emphatic than 'A Punjabi'. They say: 'Its [of the Government of India Act of 1935] fundamental fault is that it does not recognize the undeniable fact that the Muslims of India are a nation distinct from Hindus, vitally opposed to the latter in their outlook and aspirations and incapable of being merged into any other so-called nation, Hindu or non-Hindu.' Again: 'We are convinced that we, the Muslims of India, must insist persistently and strenuously on—among other things—that the Muslims of India are a nation by themselves. They have a distinct national entity wholly different from the Hindus and other non-Muslim groups. Indeed, they are more different from the Hindus than the Südeten Germans were from the Czechs.'

El. Hamza has written a book *Pakistan—A Nation* for the purpose of showing (1) that India is not one country but several countries, with widely different human environments, and (2) that the diversity of race and culture of its inhabitants is so great that they cannot be regarded as one nation (in the modern political sense of the word 'nation') but must be considered as belonging to several nations.' In showing these differences he has become rapturous, idyllic—Hinduism is of the monsoon as Islam is of the desert.⁴ 'Probably the individuality of the North-West is indicated by no other single fact in so striking a manner as by the distribution of camels over India.'⁵ 'Our associations with the camel in different directions of thought—geographical, historical and philosophic—are so multitudinous that the history of an epoch in the evolution of civilization can be read in their light. The camel may be taken

1. *Federacy of India*, by 'A Punjabi', pp. 150-1.

2. El. Hamza: *Pakistan—A Nation*, p. 7.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

as the symbol of that great transformation in the historical process which, proceeding from south-western Asia as a spontaneous race-merge, took in its sweep all the known world. Living several hundred years after, we see the brilliant colours of Arab greatness in distant and blurred magnificence ; and throughout this pageant of centuries the caravans of conquest move on camels' backs against a background of Simoom-blown sands. The days of Arab greatness are past, but the camel is still the associate of man in a world distinct in its arid vastness and the essential uniformity of religion and culture of its inhabitants. The land of the camel is still the land of scimitars and tambourines, mosques and muezzins, and domes and minarets." Only, the writer does not appear to appreciate the incongruity of argument based on the camel and such-like things for separation of the north-western region which has its camels in common with Arabia no less than with another part of India like Rajputana which is not ' the land of scimitars and tambourines, mosques and muezzins and domes and minarets '. If this argument were to prevail, there should be no ground for the separation of the eastern zone which is tropical in its fauna and flora, its green fields and prolonged and terrific monsoon. Nor should there be any Muslims in the other tropical countries like the Malaya Peninsula.

The weakness of the argument in favour of a north-western Pakistan based on the topographical diversity and such-like things has not been missed by Mr F. K. Khan Durrani who in his book *The Meaning of Pakistan* holds that ' All Muslims, whether they live in Pakistan or Hindustan, constitute one nation, and we of Pakistan must always treat our co-religionists in Hindustan as flesh of our flesh and blood of our blood.'⁷

Dealing with the argument of El. Hamza he writes : ' The author of *Pakistan—A Nation* bases his whole argument on the geographical peculiarities that distinguish the north-western provinces, the Punjab, Kashmir, the N.-W.F.P., Sind and Baluchistan, from the rest of India. Some provinces get heavier rains than do the others. The staple food of some provinces is wheat ; of others rice. Vegetation in the lands of the monsoon is rank and lush ; in others it is scanty. The flora and fauna of the provinces differ considerably. The dry lands of the North-West are the natural home of the camel, while the wet lands of the South and Assam and Bengal produce the unwieldy elephant. The dry lands of the North-West have given birth to a racial type which in many respects is different from the softer and darker types met with elsewhere. In a large country like India, inhabited as it is by peoples of many races, enclosed within many degrees of latitude and longitude, and exposed to a variety of influences of sea, mountain and desert, such diver-

⁷ Hamza, op. cit., p 72

⁸ F. K. Khan Durrani *The Meaning of Pakistan*, p viii

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4. El. Hamza: *Pakistan—A Nation*, p. 7.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

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7. Hamza, op cit, p 72

8 F K. Khan Durrani: *The Meaning of Pakistan*, p viii

sities of peoples and produce are natural and unavoidable, and to the politics of Muslim India they are wholly irrelevant ; for were we to follow this line of argument, we of the North-West will have of necessity to wash our hands of the larger portion of the Muslim population of India who live in lands other than those of Pakistan, dress differently and eat food which is not exactly the same as ours. We would have to treat them as aliens, with whom we can have no community of life or interests, a proposition which no Muslim of Pakistan would care to maintain even for a minute, which in fact every Muslim of the Punjab would dismiss forthwith as unthinkable.⁹

To prove the thesis others—notably Dr B. R. Ambedkar in his book *Thoughts on Pakistan*—have taken pains to collect together passages from books on history to show how Muslim invaders and rulers of India desecrated and destroyed thousands of Hindu temples and broke into pieces images installed in them and converted them into mosques or removed their building materials like posts and pillars to be used in the construction of Muslim mosques in other places ; how they offered to Hindus who came under their sway the alternative of the sword or the Quran and how thousands of Hindus were tortured or slaughtered on their refusal to accept the Muslim faith. The inference that is drawn is that the Hindus have not forgotten and cannot forget these atrocities and they have indelible marks burnt on their memory which cannot be obliterated. It is further asserted that Hindu-Muslim riots due to some minor cause—such as music before a mosque or the sacrifice of a cow—give further point to the argument that the old hostility persists, and common subjection to the British, and a strong rule by the latter have not succeeded in bringing about a reconciliation between the two communities.

Now, it is somewhat difficult to understand this line of argument for carving out portions of India to be placed under Muslim rule, which after all, is the object of those who advocate such division of India into Hindu and Muslim Zones.

Is it suggested that Islam sanctioned and encouraged those acts of sacrilege and vandalism—sacrilege from the point of view of the non-Muslim and vandalism from the point of view of art ? If it sanctioned and justified those acts, then can it be said that it has ceased to sanction and encourage such acts ? What evidence is there that there has been a change in the attitude of Islam in these respects ? If they were acts of barbarity done by ambitious men professing Islam who took cover under Islam in pursuit of their aim which had nothing to do with the faith of the Prophet of Arabia, what chance or expectation is there that people professing Islam will not arise in the future with similar ambitions and will not

utilize the power that they will enjoy in the same way? Is it suggested that Muslim rule should be established in the segregated portions so that the same atrocities may be committed and perpetuated on those non-Muslims who may have the misfortune to be left there? If that is so, then none should expect a non-Muslim to be a party to any such scheme.

If all that is not the teaching of Islam and is in fact opposed to its fundamental tenets of peace and tolerance, is it desirable to rake up old history and place those instances before the Muslims and non-Muslims today? C. rities which had better be of Muslims as a shame defiled their faith by such acts in the name of Islam when it did not sanction or justify them and when they committed them for their own aggrandizement and not for the propagation of Islam which depended and depends upon purer and nobler methods for its propagation; and for the sake of non-Muslims so that the nightmare of a religion which can perpetrate such atrocities for its propagation may be lifted and the era of goodwill and reconciliation may continue and prosper?

If what is sought to be made out by such quotations is even partially accepted by Muslims and non-Muslims as a part of Muslim rule, then Muslims have to acquire the right to perpetrate and perpetuate them by the same methods by which those who perpetrated them in the past acquired the power to do so. The same sources which furnish these instances and quotations will also show that the Muslims of those days never got that right or power by agreement or consent of their non-Muslim contemporaries. If the passage of centuries and all that has happened in the world during these centuries and world conditions of today have not brought about any change in the attitude of Muslims of India towards the non-Muslims of India and vice versa, why should it be expected that the non-Muslims should change in this one respect and agree to the perpetration of wrongs and atrocities, which are condemned by all civilized persons all the world over, including the Muslims of India? Either such acts are a part of Islamic law and faith or they are not. If they are, no non-Muslim can agree to anything which gives the least opening for their repetition by the establishment of an 'ideal Islamic state with the ultimate ideal of a world revolution on purely Islamic lines'¹⁰—an Islamic state which on the assumptions made above is *ex hypothesi* out to repeat its history as disclosed in such quotations. If they are not, no useful purpose is served by reviving their memory. They can only further exacerbate the feelings of non-Muslims, and whether one approves of a division or not, further exacerbation of feelings can hardly be the object of

any one. If it is intended to show that Hindus and Muslims cannot on account of such dealings in the past agree to live together and must therefore agree to separate, it is worth while remembering that just the opposite effect may be produced. The Hindus may not agree for this very reason to leave millions of their co-religionists in the Muslim area for a repetition of the same deeds against them. Such citations and quotations have thus no value or use in considering the question in a practical way.

Now, the object or utility of such quotations apart, it does not require much industry or acumen to cull together such passages from dry-as-dust books written in the distant past or modern times. Books on history until recently dealt commonly and very largely only with kings and conquerors, their doings and misdoings, their wars and victories, the magnificence of their courts and the intrigues of their palaces. Not much attention was paid by the writers of these books to the common man who was content to lead his hum-drum life in a quiet and peaceful manner, earning his livelihood by the sweat of his brow either in the field with his plough and spade, or in his home with his spinning wheel and loom or adze and chisel or sickle and hammer or needle and thread, and a host of other instruments used in cottages in small industries. The lives and doings of priests and pious men, of savants and sages, of learned men and social reformers, poets and philosophers, painters and musicians have not been given the importance they deserve in the life history of a people. The writers of such books have been not a little influenced by a false notion that the religious zeal of a Muslim king or conqueror could be proved only by such deeds against *Kafirs* and they owed a duty to these kings and conquerors—whose courtiers they used to be in most cases—and to Islam, to record such incidents with circumstantial details to serve as examples to other rulers to follow and to the conquered people to be frightened by. One need not discount the incidents that are related as exaggerated or false. Only, one must remember that such incidents were not the only incidents worth recording; and if an equally detailed account of other incidents showing how Hindus and Muslims lived together sharing one anothers' sorrows and joys for hundreds of years, how the Saints and Sadhus of each influenced and moulded the customs and rites, the lives and environment of the other, how the rites and festivities observed in many Muslim houses in connexion with births and marriages tally with those observed in Hindu homes, how the same rites and customs differ among Muslims living in different Provinces of India as much as they differ among the Hindus, how it was Muslim saints to whom the credit for conversion of large numbers of Hindus should go more than to the fire and sword of the Muslim conquerors and kings, the space occupied by such accounts would be infinitely more than that

taken up by the accounts of the oppression and tyranny of the Muslim kings and conquerors. The number of pages taken in writing such a history would bear the same proportion to the pages occupied by the books from which quotations are made and on which textbooks on history are based, as the common people of the country bear to the number of kings and their courtiers, their generals and governors, their harems and their palaces. It bears the same proportion as the days of peaceful life and deeds of goodwill and charity, fellow-feeling and tolerance bear to those of strife and conflict, of riots and hooliganism, of murder, arson and loot committed by members of the one community against those of the other. And yet even today the space occupied in newspapers by the latter is out of all proportion as compared with that of the former; and if one were to write a history after 500 years, based on such newspaper reports or to quote only these reports, one could easily prove on their basis that there was hardly a day of peace in India even during the prevalence of the Pax Britannica. For comparative lack of appropriate material it is, therefore, not easy to write a complete and comprehensive book dealing with social and cultural movements, their deep and abiding effects on the life, and their intangible and invisible moulding of the make-up of the people concerned.

2. NATIONALITY AND STATE

Since the demand for the establishment of separate and independent Muslim States in the North-West and East of India is based on the theory that Muslims constitute a separate nation—separate from the Hindus and all others who inhabit the geographical entity we call India, it is necessary to understand clearly what is meant by a nation. The fact of geographical unity of India cannot be denied, for the simple reason that geography cannot be altered by man. Indeed Mr F. K. Khan Durrani says distinctly: 'I agree on the contrary, with Dr Beni Prasad, that "there is no country marked out by the sea and the mountains so clearly to be a single whole as India." From the Suleman Range to the hills of Assam and from the Himalayas to the sea, in spite of all its variety of races, climes and topographical details, India is one geographical unity.'¹

What then is a nation? What constitutes a nation? The question has been posed and answered by the supporters of the scheme for partition, and learned authors have been quoted in support of the answer given. Mr Durrani who has dealt with the point at great length comes to some conclusions which it is worth while

¹ F. K. Khan Durrani: *The Meaning of Pakistan*, p. 2

recording : "(1) Though geographically India is one unity, its peoples are not, and in the making of states and nations it is the people that count and not geography. . . . The living spirit of man cannot be enslaved, in the words of Renan, "by the course of rivers or the direction of mountain ranges". "The land", says Renan, "provides a substratum, the field of battle and work ; man provides the soul : man is everything in the formation of that sacred thing which is called a people. Nothing of material nature suffices for it." . . . (2) In fact, race too, like geography is not a determining factor either for or against the formation of nations. . . . (3) Hindu leaders have been propagating the idea for two decades that religion should not be mixed with politics, and that a united nation should be formed on the basis of politics alone. Now is it possible to create a nation on the basis of politics alone ? Political philosophers think that purely political ties do not suffice to create a nation." He quotes Lord Bryce and Prof. Sidgwick in support of his thesis. Sidgwick writes : 'A political society is in an unsatisfactory and comparatively unstable condition when its members have no consciousness of any bond of unity among them except their obedience to the same government. Such a society is lacking in the cohesive force required to resist the disorganizing shocks and jars which foreign wars and discontents are likely to cause from time to time. Accordingly, we recognise that it is desirable that the members of a state should be united by the further bonds vaguely implied in the term "Nation".' Further, Sidgwick writes : 'What is really essential to the modern conception of a state which is also a Nation is merely that the persons composing it should have, generally speaking, a consciousness of belonging to one another, of being members of one body, over and above what they derive from the fact of being under one government, so that, if their government were destroyed by war or revolution, they would still tend to hold firmly together. When they have this consciousness, we regard them as forming a "Nation", whatever else they lack.' Again, Lord Bryce defines nationality as 'an aggregate of men drawn together and linked together by certain sentiments', and says : 'The chief among these are Racial sentiment and Religious sentiment, but there is also that sense of community which is created by the use of a common language, the possession of a common literature, the recollection of common achievements or sufferings in the past, the existence of common customs and habits of thought, common ideals and aspirations. Sometimes all these linking sentiments are present and hold the members of the aggregate together ; sometimes one or more may be absent. The more of these links that exist in any given case, the stronger is the sentiment of unity. In each case, the test is not merely how many links there are, but how strong each parti-

2. Darrani, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-6. 3 *Ibid.*, p. 7. 4. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

cular link is.⁵ After quoting some others Mr Durrani comes to the conclusion that 'nationality is in fact a matter of consciousness only, a mere psychological condition,'⁶ and in this he is supported by Dr Ambedkar whom he quotes :—'It is a feeling of consciousness of a kind which on the one hand binds together those who have it so strongly that it overrides all differences arising out of economic conflicts or social gradations, and, on the other severs them from those who are not of their kind.'⁷

The final conclusion of Mr Durrani, therefore, is : '(4) There is absolutely no group-consciousness or consciousness of kind between the Hindus and the Muslims. They cannot sit together at the same dining table ; they cannot intermarry. The food of one is abomination to the other. The Hindu gets even polluted by the Musalman's touch. There are no social contacts between them to make possible the birth of a common group-consciousness. It is, indeed, psychologically impossible for the two groups to combine to form a single united whole.'⁸

Now this conception of nationality is comparatively speaking a modern and recent conception which has been developed during the last two or at the most three centuries or so. While the elements mentioned by Lord Bryce or Prof. Sidgwick are found more or less in all those groups which are regarded as constituting a nation, it is not correct to take each item by itself and see whether, and to what extent, it is present in any particular group and determine therefrom whether that particular group can be called a nation. It is the resultant of the totality of these various elements acting and reacting upon one another, and the historical setting in which they have so acted and reacted that determines nationality. As Stalin has pointed out, 'a nation is primarily a community, a definite community of people' which is not necessarily 'racial or tribal'. It is not also a 'casual or ephemeral conglomeration' but a 'stable community of people'. A common language is one of the characteristic features of a nation. And so is also a common territory another characteristic feature of a nation. Community of economic life—economic cohesion—is one more characteristic feature. Apart from these a nation has its own specific spiritual complexion, its own psychological make-up—or what is otherwise called national character—which manifests itself in a distinctive culture 'A nation', according to Stalin 'is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture'⁹

We must also draw a distinction between a State and a Nation. They are not always coterminous and we have had in the past and have got in the present living examples of multinational States or

5. Durrani, *op cit.*, p. 8. 6 *ibid.* p. 11 7 *ibid.* p. 12 8 *ibid.* p. 13
9 J Stalin *Marxism and the Question of Nationalities*, p. 6

States comprising more than one nation. Thus the English and the French in Canada, although belonging to two different national groups, constitute one State. The English and the Boers of South Africa, after a bloody war, by agreement constituted one State. In the United States of America, people belonging to many nationalities have settled down as members of one State. The Soviet Republic of Russia comprises many nationalities which enjoy administrative autonomy and have the right to secede from the Union guaranteed by the Constitution. The administrative autonomy of the constituent Republics now extends as far as the maintenance of their own armed forces and the right to enter into direct relations with foreign States, conclude agreements with them, and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives. The Swiss furnish the classical illustration of peoples bearing national affinity to three nations by whom they are surrounded, viz. the French, the German and the Italian, and yet constituting one single State. 'It is more accurate to say that the word nationality can refer to either one of two sentiments', says C. A. Macartney,¹⁰ 'which in their origin and their essence are absolutely distinct, although in practice the one commonly identifies itself with the other. It is unfortunate that the accident of historical development in England has tended to make them in fact almost identical in that country, and the English language, reflecting the slovenly realism of its users, makes do with one term for the two. Nevertheless, nationality meaning the feeling of appurtenance to a *nation*, is fundamentally different from nationality in the sense of membership of a State. They spring from different causes ; and it is perfectly possible for them to be directed towards different objects.

'The former, which may for convenience be called the sense of personal nationality, is founded on characteristics which are personal, often inherited, and usually objective. These characteristics exist in the individual quite independently of the locality in which he may be domiciled, whether the majority of the inhabitants share them or no, and independently of the political regime under which he may live, whether this be in the hands of persons possessing the same characteristics or no. The body of persons possessing these characteristics constitutes the nation.'¹¹ The characteristics on which this consciousness is based vary greatly, but broadly speaking, they are covered by the *trinity of the Minority Treaties* : *race, language and religion*. 'In themselves, it must be repeated, they are absolutely devoid of political significance. A German of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Brazil, or Honolulu is every bit as much a German as is a citizen of Berlin.

'Entirely different in its basis and true purpose is the State.

10. C. A. Macartney : *National States and National Minorities*, 11. 1917, p. 6.

The State is the organ by means of which the common affairs of a number of people are administered and (usually) protected; the people who collectively compose the State being, unfortunately, known in England by the same name "nation" as is also applied to the quite different natural unit discussed above. The extent to which their affairs are regarded as being of common concern, and thus falling within the competence of the State to regulate, varies enormously, not only from age to age but also from country to country. In some cases it goes hardly beyond defence; in others it covers most aspects of life beyond purely private relationships. It is, however, worth remarking that those cultural attributes which go to make up the idea of personal nationality are among the very last to which most States have turned their attention and that even today they are largely considered as being no matter for State control . . . On the other hand, most of the duties performed by the State are entirely unrelated to questions of personal nationality. The defence of the common home, the maintenance of public order, the prevention and punishment of crime, the construction of communications, the preservation of the public wealth, the equal imposition and collection of taxes, are matters of equal concern to every inhabitant of the State, whether he acknowledges Christ or Mahomet, whether his mother-tongue be English, Welsh or Yiddish. All must contribute towards these political and social activities which are the true functions of the State, and all alike benefit from them.¹²

Thus while personal nationality is an important factor in the formation of a State, it is not always the sole or even the dominant factor. On the other hand, while it may be conceded that purely political ties do not suffice to create a nation, it cannot be denied that they do constitute an important factor. If a group is subject to external pressure, then that 'pressure from without', in the words of Julian Huxley, 'is probably the largest single factor in the process of national evolution.' So it has happened in India—but of this later.

The question of National States has been subjected to intensive study since the end of the first World War and much literature has grown round it. This study has been pursued after the publication in 1934 of C. A. Macartney's authoritative book from which I have quoted at length in the preceding pages. The result of all this study has been to confirm the conclusions he arrived at, namely, that a distinction should be made between personal nationality and political nationality, that a State need not be coterminous with a nationality, that in fact the attempt to establish national States has ended in failure and created new problems, that the experience of national States and their treatment of national minorities within them has not been happy or encouraging, that the guarantee even of

the League of Nations for enforcing the Minority Treaties against national States has proved, in many cases, ineffective and futile, that the solution of the question of minorities does not lie in the direction of establishing national States which is impossible of attainment on account of the impossibility of getting a completely homogeneous State eliminating all heterogeneous minorities and that the solution should be sought in a multinational state which allows freedom for all national minorities to develop their special personal nationality.

Friedmann points out that nationalism and the modern State are 'two forces neither identical nor necessarily parallel or allied'.¹³ His conclusion is: 'What this brief survey has attempted to demonstrate is the inherent self-contradiction of the ideal of the sovereign State based on national self-determination, and the impossibility of a satisfactory solution as long as the sovereign national state remains the ultimate standard of value. It seems that all serious students of the problem agree on this point. After a searching study of the problem, Macartney commends, on the basis of the experience of Soviet Russia and Great Britain, the multinational State.'¹⁴ He quotes with approval from *The Future of Nations* by Prof. Carr, p. 49: 'The existence of a more or less homogeneous racial or linguistic group bound together by a common tradition and the cultivation of a common culture must cease to provide a *prima facie* case for the setting up or maintenance of an independent political unit,'¹⁵ and from *Europe, Russia and the Future* by D. H. Cole, p. 14: 'But nationalities can no longer in this twentieth century provide a basis for the State.'¹⁶

His further conclusion is that the national State, particularly if it happens to be a small State, is impossible under the present technical and mechanical development in the world. It is impossible for such a State to defend itself against aggression, even if it be able to provide more or less adequately for the necessities of life within its borders. 'But modern defence implies much more than that. It implies the comprehensiveness of resources and reserves in men and materials, which has greatly accentuated the inequality between big powers and small national States.'¹⁷ He summarizes his conclusion thus: 'The analysis has revealed that the predominant trend of the political, economic and social forces of today leads away from the national State. . . . The alliance between Nationalism and the State reaches a crisis when both Nationalism and the modern State begin to overreach themselves. . . . An alternative solution of the dilemma of national self-determination is the multi-

13. W. Friedmann: *The Crisis of the National State* (1913), p. 9.

14. *ibid.*, p. 40.

15. *ibid.*, p. 133.

16. *ibid.*, p. 11.

17. *ibid.*, p. 140.

national State in which a powerful political union guarantees cultural autonomy to different national groups, but demands the sacrifice of political, military and economic sovereignty.¹⁸

Mr A. Cobban's study on National Self-determination was issued in 1945 under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. His conclusions are the same as those of Macartney and Friedmann quoted above, as the following extract from his book will show: 'The nation as a political unit, or State, is a utilitarian organization, framed by political ingenuity for the achievement of political, with which may be included economic, ends. Politics is the realm of expediency, and the measure of its success is the degree to which the material bases of the good life—law and order, peace and economic welfare—are realized. The nation as a cultural conception, on the contrary, is normally regarded as a good thing in itself, a basic fact, an inescapable datum of human life. It belongs to the realm of the activity of the human spirit, its achievements are in the field of art and literature, philosophy and religion. . . . The distinctness of the ends proposed for the two developments which both, unfortunately, are described by the same word nation, is fundamental. That this is not merely a theoretical differentiation can easily be shown.'¹⁹ He cites the example of the French and British Canadians having a common political nationality without abandoning their personal nationality and of the various States of Spanish America having the same cultural background but divided into a number of separate political states. 'Many other illustrations of the failure of cultural and political nationality to coincide might be found, and where the attempt has been made in modern times, to force them both into the same mould, the result has usually been disaster.'²⁰

He further points out that nationality as a criterion of statehood furnishes only a variable standard inasmuch as nationality varies from period to period, from country to country and even from individual to individual. It also implies homogeneity in the population of the State which is patently not true, as the world cannot be divided into homogeneous divisions of the human race. His final conclusion is: 'In the Old World where a *tabula rasa* cannot be made of the pre-existing complex of cultural nations and political states, there is an evident necessity of abandoning the belief that the Nation-State is the one and only model for a sound political community. The multinational State must re-enter the political canon from which, as Acton many years ago declared, it should never have been expelled. . . . The history of the recent past, as well as of the last century is far from teaching the necessary

18. Friedmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-4

19. A. Cobban, *National Self-determination*, p. 60

20. *ibid.*, p. 60

identity of the political state and the nation in any other sense. We found ourselves indeed forced to the conclusion that in most cases they cannot possibly be made to coincide. . . . The attempt to make the culturally united Nation-State the one and only basis of legitimate political organization has proved untenable in practice. It was never tenable in theory.²¹

The confusion that has arisen between the two distinct entities, Nation and State, is due to the setting up of National Self-determination as an absolute dogma according to which every cultural group *ipso facto* is entitled to claim a separate independent State for itself. But it cannot be denied that there can be no such absolute principle and that National Self-determination is just as limited as the freedom allowed to an individual in a society by various considerations.

'In short,' asks Cobban, 'are there not geographical, historical, economic, and political considerations which rule out national self-determination in the form of the sovereign State for many of the smaller nationalities of the world? Even if the majority of members of a nation desire political independence, circumstances may prohibit it, and the mere desire, of however many people, will not alter them. In the words of Burke "If we cry like children for the moon, like children we must cry on."'²²

I may add that all these considerations prohibit any partition of India, particularly because it is impossible to draw any boundary line separating the partitioned States without leaving at least as large a minority in the partitioned Muslim States as the Muslims constitute in the whole of India. The economic and military conditions of India dictate its continuance as a large political State and forbid its break-up into smaller independent national units. Secession is a work of destruction and can be justified not as the first but as the last step in an extreme case when all else has failed. Even if that condition has been reached in India—and no group except the Muslim League has asserted anything approaching such an extreme proposition—separation of any particular area will not solve the problem as there will be no less than 200 or 300 lakhs of Muslims left in Hindu India and no less than 479 or 196 lakhs of non-Muslims left in the Muslim States according as areas with non-Muslim majorities are included in or excluded from the Muslim State as shown later on. We must, therefore, think of a solution which is in keeping with modern thought, which does not cut across the history of centuries, which does not fly in the face of geography, which does not make the defence of the country infinitely more difficult if not impossible in the present-day conditions of the world, which does not place a burden on the separated States that they will not be

21. Cobban, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-3

22. *ibid.*, p. 73.

able to bear, which does not condemn in its result the common man in the new States to a *life of misery and squalor* for an indefinite period, which does not create the problem of irredentism alike in the Muslim and the Hindu states, and which has not been conceived in frenzy and does not prepare the ground for perpetual conflict.

3. MUSLIMS—A SEPARATE NATION

To prove the case for partition it is not enough to show that Hindus and Musalmans do not constitute a nation. It must further be shown that the Musalmans constitute a nation and need a separate State. Mr Durrani is explicit in his views : 'The ancient Hindus were not a nation. They were only a people, a mere herd.

'The Muslims of India were none better. Islam, indeed, became a state in the lifetime of its Founder himself. It has a well-defined political philosophy : I should say Islam is a political philosophy. . . . I do not at all mean that the Islamic State is a theocracy. . . . The Islamic State is a democracy, for whose maintenance every individual Muslim is responsible. *La Islam illa be Jama'et-hu*—"There is no Islam without an organized society," says Omar the Great. Unfortunately, the Islamic State did not endure long enough. The Omayyads and the Abbasids destroyed it and turned it into *mulk* or autocratic, despotic, hereditary monarchy. . . . It was under these two autocracies that two more elements entered into the Muslim society to vitiate and corrupt its political life, namely, theology and Sufism . . . These two things combined to pervert the Muslim's conscience and changed Islam from an ethico-political philosophy into a sort of "religion", a something which political slogan-mongers call private relation between the individual and his God. . . . At the time the Muslims conquered India the divorce of religion and politics had become the accepted creed of the Muslims throughout the world. The men who conquered India were not the national army of a Muslim State but paid mercenaries of an imperial despot. The State they established in India was not a national Muslim State, but held, maintained and exploited in the interests of an autocrat and his satellites. The Muslim Empire in India was Muslim only in the sense that the man who wore the crown professed to be a Muslim. Through the whole length of their rule in India Muslims never developed the sense of nationhood. . . . So we had two peoples, Hindus and Muslims, living side by side in equal servitude to an imperial despotism, and both devoid of any national feeling or national ambition.

'Much has been written on the irreconcilability of the religious conceptions, beliefs and practices of the Hindus and Muslims. . . . Yet, in spite of them all, there is something in their respective

faiths which enabled the two peoples to live amicably together for many centuries, and which, if what they have learnt and suffered under British Rule could be washed out of their minds and the same old religious mentality could be recreated in them which inspired their fore-fathers of a century ago, would enable them again to live amicably together as good neighbours and citizens of the same State. That something is the spirit of tolerance inculcated in both religions. . . . If these relations between the two communities had continued uninterrupted, in due time a nation, united in mind and soul, would have been born on the soil of India. Can those days ever possibly come back ?"¹

'So, in spite of their centuries of close association and sympathetic intercourse the Hindus and the Muslims remained separate. The two streams could not mix. They were two nationalities, so utterly different indeed that if at any time the sentiment, which the political philosopher calls national consciousness, were to awaken in them and become dynamic, they could not but react differently ; they could not but grow into two separate nations. For nationalism or nationhood is nothing but the consciousness of separate nationality become dynamic. This is what has happened to the Hindus and the Muslims.'² 'The two peoples have become self-conscious nations, and not until they readjust their relations in the light of this new consciousness will there be any peace between them.'³

Mr Durrani then proceeds to inquire how this consummation has taken place and comes to the conclusion that, 'in a word, it was one of the direct results of the British policy of discrimination and favouring one community at the expense of the other.'

'The nationalism of the Hindus and the Musalmans has been of slow growth and no definite date can be assigned as to when it ripened definitely. It showed itself at first in the form of economic rivalry, especially with respect to Government employment, which later turned into political rivalry and finally into national animosity.'⁴

Among the many things which helped to depress and ruin the Musalmans under the British he mentions : (1) the ruin of industry and commerce in Bengal ; (2) the Permanent Settlement of Bengal by which the lower Hindu revenue collectors were made landlords and the higher Muslim revenue officers were thrown on the rubbish-heap and replaced by European officers ; (3) the resumption of rent-free grants upon which the Muslim system of education depended, causing its decay ; (4) with their educational system ruined, the Muslims could not but lose their place in Government services leading to a Hindu monopoly of official preferment, which

1. F. K. Khan Durrani : *The Meaning of Pakistan*, pp. 34-44.

2. *Id.*, p. 47.

3. *Id.*, p. 48.